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SELF-DEALING TRUSTEES AND THE
EXONERATION CLAUSE: CAN TRUSTEES
EVER PROFIT FROM TRANSACTIONS
INVOLVING TRUST PROPERTY?
CHARLES BRYAN BARON, ESQ.*
INTRODUCTION
In the landmark New York Court of Appeals case of Mein-
hard v. Salmon,' Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo set forth the
trustee's creed:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fi-
duciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.2
The sale or purchase of trust property by a trustee, com-
monly referred to as self-dealing, is one such proscribed behav-
ior.' Justice Kent outlined the underlying rationale for the rule
" Trusts and Estates Associate, Spielman & Kassimir, P.C., New York City.
Former Assistant District Attorney, Queens County. B.A. 1981, University of Penn-
sylvania, magna cum laude; LL.B. 1986, Bar-Han University (Israel); LL.M. 1997
Touro Law School, summa cum laude. I am grateful to Professor Daniel Subotnik
for his insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article, to Ilene S. Cooper, Esq.
for inspiring me to write this article, to Susan R. Liberman, Esq. for her research
assistance, and to Esther M. Schonfeld for proofreading this article. I dedicate this
article to the memory of my beloved grandparents, Haskel and Marion Mark. Both
of my grandparents personified Chief Justice Cardozo's high fiduciary standard:
"the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive," in the conduct of their business and
personal lives.
' Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that joint venturers
owe each other a duty of the finest loyalty because of their fiduciary relationship).
2 Id at 546.
3 See In re Noonan's Estate, 63 A.2d 80, 83 (Pa. 1949) (holding the executor li-
able for self-dealing in selling the trust property where he had a personal interest in
the transaction that might affect his judgment); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 170(1) cmt. b. (1959) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] ("A trustee with power to sell
trust property is under a duty not to sell to himself ... [even if he] acts in good faith
... [and] pays a fair consideration."). But see In re Scarborough Properties Corp., 255
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against self dealing:
[The purpose of the rule] is to bar the more effectually every
avenue to fraud. Such a purchase[] [of trust property by a trus-
tee], though it may not originate in any purpose to defraud, is a
constructive fraud, because the natural tendency is mischievous
and harmful. The rule is founded in the highest wisdom. It
recognizes the infirmity of human nature, and interposes a bar-
rier against the operation of selfishness and greed. It discour-
ages fraud by taking away motive for its perpetration. It tends
to insure fidelity on the part of the trustee, and operates as a
protection to a large class of persons whose estates, by reason of
infancy, infirmity, or other causes, are intrusted to the man-
agement of others.4
This Article will analyze the question of whether a trustee,
acting in an individual capacity, is permitted to profit personally
from transactions involving trust property. The analysis will
include an examination of the rule against self-dealing, as well
as the rationale for the rule's existence. Part I examines various
forms of self-dealing transactions, followed by a discussion of the
consequences of self-dealing upon the transaction itself. In these
contexts, beneficiaries have frequently invoked the "no further
inquiry" rule so that a court may set aside a self-dealing trans-
action without considering the trustee's good faith or benefit to
the estate in implementing the transaction.5
Part II examines the exoneration clause as perhaps the only
method available to circumvent the harshness of the "no further
inquiry" rule and rescue an otherwise voidable self-dealing
transaction so as to give meaning to the terms of the trust in-
strument and uphold the intent of the testator. Yet, even so, a
close reading of the relevant case law reveals that the language
N.E.2d 761, 764 (N.Y. 1969) (rejecting the application of the rule against self-dealing
where the trustee purchased the trust property after obtaining court approval)
(citations omitted).
4 In re Ryan's Will, 52 N.E.2d 909, 923-24 (N.Y. 1943) (quoting Justice Kent in
Bergen v. Bennett, 1 Caines, Cas., 19).
'See Interfirst Bank Dallas v. Risser, 739 S.W.2d 882, 898 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)
(explaining that the "no further inquiry" rule invalidated self-dealing transactions
despite the consideration of good faith and fairness); Manchester v. Cleveland Trust
Co., 168 N.E.2d 745, 752 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960) (stating that the "no further inquiry"
rule applies to set aside the self-dealing transaction on the basis that there may be
fraud once a breach of trust has been established). But see In re Estate of Rothko,
372 N.E.2d 291, 296 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that the lower court properly considered
the issue of fairness regarding the trustees transactions instead of merely applying
the "no further inquiry" rule).
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contained in an exoneration clause permitting self-dealing
transactions must be explicit, clear, and unmistakable. A naked
grant of managerial authority is insufficient to sustain the self-
dealing transaction. Furthermore, even where trust language is
narrowly drawn, profits accruing to a trustee from the self-
dealing transaction may only be "normal" and "reasonable" prof-
its such as those made by a third party in an arm's length trans-
action, and not those realized through the sale of trust property
to a trustee at a fraction of market value.
Part III will consider the efforts made in the Restatement
(Second) on Trusts to ensure that a trustee remains loyal to his
trust, while at the same time allowing a settlor to provide, by the
explicit terms of the trust, that a trustee may profit from self-
dealing.6 The analysis will reveal that the Restatement inade-
quately addresses the interplay between a trustee's duty to act
in good faith towards the trust and the settlor's power to
authorize self-dealing. This inadequacy may have led to a con-
tradiction between sections 170 and 222 of the Restatement,
with the former authorizing exoneration clauses permitting trus-
tees to profit from self-dealing, and the latter prohibiting such
exoneration clauses as violative of public policy. Finally, Part IV
proposes several solutions in order to resolve the contradiction.
I. SELF-DEALING TRANSACTIONS
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides that the trus-
tee has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interests of
the beneficiary.! Accordingly, a trustee may not lend trust funds
to himself.' In In re Estate of Stowell,9 the executor of the estate,
Rand, was both the trustee of a testamentary trust as well as the
president and shareholder of a closely held corporation whose
shares constituted the entire corpus of the trust.'0 Rand, as ex-
ecutor," lent himself and the corporation estate funds.' The
6 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 170 cmt. a ("A trustee ... is under a duty
not to profit at the expense of the beneficiary ... unless authorized to do so by the
terms of the trust .... ").
7 See id. § 170(1).
8 See id. § 170 cmt. 1. ("The trustee violates his duty to the beneficiary ... where
he uses the trust property for his own purposes. Thus, he cannot properly use trust
money in his business, or lend trust money to himself ....")
" 595 A.2d 1022 (Me. 1991).
'0 See id. at 1023-24.
" Rand was a "personal representative" under Maine law. See ME. REV. STAT.
1998]
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court found no express authority in the trust instrument that
allowed for personal loans or loans to the corporation. Further-
more, Rand had failed to obtain the consent of, or give notice to,
the beneficiaries for either of the loan transactions. Rand even-
tually repaid the loans to the estate.13
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that Rand's self-
dealing was a breach of his fiduciary duty as a matter of law be-
cause "[tihe record disclose[d] neither an authorization by the
will, trust instrument, or the court, nor a voluntary consent by
the beneficiaries to a conflict of interest transaction."14 With re-
gard to the loan transaction between Rand as personal represen-
tative and Rand pro se, the court reasoned that the transaction
created the conflict of interest envisaged in the Maine Probate
Code,15 as well as section 170(1) of the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts.16 As far as the loan transaction with the company was
concerned, the court observed that Rand held 19% of the com-
pany stock and was president of the company. His duty as
president, which called for minimizing costs by obtaining loans
at a low interest rate, conflicted with his duty to the estate to
maximize the return on such loans by charging the company
ANN. tit. 18-A, § 1-201(30) (West 1964). The statute's definition of "personal repre-
sentative" includes the executor of the estate. Id.
12 See In re Estate of Stowell, 595 A.2d at 1024.
13 See id.
14 Id. at 1025 (referring to title 18-A, sections 3-713 and 7-404 of the Maine Pro-
bate Code).
'5 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 3-713 (West 1964). The code states, in
pertinent part:
Any sale or encumbrance to the personal representative, ... or any trans-
action which is affected by a substantial conflict of interest on the part of
the personal representative, is voidable by any person interested in the es-
tate except one who has consented after fair disclosure, unless
(1) The will or a contract entered into by the decedent expressly
authorized the transaction; or
(2) The transaction is approved by the court after notice to interested
persons.
Id. (emphasis added).
1" See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3 at. The transaction arguably contravened
the provisions of section 170(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which pro-
vides: "Me trustee in dealing with the beneficiary on the trustee's own account is
under a duty to the beneficiary to deal fairly with him and to communicate to him
all material facts in connection with the transaction which the trustee knows or
should know." Id. The Stowell court relied solely upon section 170(1) of the Re-
statement (Second) of Trusts in its decision without considering section 170(2). See
In re Estate of Stowell, 595 A2d at 1025.
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higher rates of interest. 7 Accordingly, the court remanded the
case to the Probate Court to determine the extent of the sur-
charge that Rand would be required to reimburse to the estate.1 8
The prohibition against self-dealing also encompasses situa-
tions in which a trustee's interests are in competition with those
of the trust beneficiary. 9 Two egregious examples of this are il-
lustrated by the case of Hanson v. First State Bank and Trust
Co.'° In Hanson, a bank was appointed testamentary trustee.
The testatrix's brother, Haley, was chairman of the board of the
bank and controlled most of its stock.2' The testatrix had owned
stock in another company which in turn owned all of the stock of
a cable company. After the testatrix's death, the FCC ordered
the company, of which Haley was also a director, to distribute
the cable company stock to its shareholders. The bank, as trus-
tee, received calls from brokers offering to purchase the cable
company stock at $1.39 per share, but Haley separately negoti-
ated the sale of his own shares in the cable company to Storer
Communications for $5 per share.'
In a second transaction, the bank, as trustee, leased a va-
cant lot to an auto company. The vacant lot was owned by the
trust, Haley, and other family members. Haley was also the
principal owner and officer of the auto company.' The Georgia
Supreme Court held that Haley had so dominated the bank that
the conflicts between his individual interests and the interests of
the trust were attributable to the bank." The court character-
ized the series of transactions as "a case of prohibited 'self-
dealing' by Haley, who, because of his control over the bank,
[was] the virtual or de facto, trustee, and, at the same time,
ha[d] engaged in extensive dealings on his own account with the
17 See idL In Stowell the court found that Rand's loans from the decedents estate
created a conflict of interest violating his duty of undivided loyalty. Id.
18 See id. at 1026.
19 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 170 cmt. p (stating that entering into sub-
stantial competition with the beneficiary's interest is a violation of the trustees
duty to the beneficiary).0 385 S.E.2d 266 (Ga. 1989).
21 See id. at 266-67.
2 See id. at 270.
2' See id. Haley wore not two, but three hats simultaneously. He was the co-
owner of the leased premises with the trust (as lessor), the substantial owner of the
lessee auto company, and through the instrumentality of the bank, purported to act
as trustee as well. See id- at 270-71.
24 See id& at 268.
1998]
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trust."2' Consequently, the court remanded for a determination
of the conflicts between Haley's interests and those of the bene-
ficiaries. 6
The New York case of In re Estate of Rothko'7 is an addi-
tional, yet no less egregious, illustration of fiduciaries who have
allowed their interests to compete with those of the trust benefi-
ciaries. Mark Rothko was a renowned expressionist painter who
died in 1970.28 His will was admitted to probate without objec-
tion. 9 The will had nominated three executors, Reis (the will's
draftsman), Stamos, and Levine." Within three weeks after the
will had been admitted to probate, the Rothko estate entered
into two contracts for the sale and disposition of 798 of Rothko's
paintings.3' In the first contract, the estate agreed to sell one
hundred paintings to Marlborough A.G. ("MAG"), a Liechten-
stein Corporation.32 In the second contract, the estate agreed to
consign 698 Rothko paintings to Marlborough Gallery ("MNY"), a
New York corporation and an affiliate of MAG.33
At the time that negotiations were taking place for the sale
and consignment of the Rothko paintings to MNY and MAG, co-
executor Reis was also serving as a director of MNY.' Notwith-
standing the fact that Reis purportedly refused to participate in
the negotiations themselves, he reserved the right to ratify or
veto the actions of the co-executors regarding the consignment of
the Rothko paintings to MNY."5 Ultimately, the Surrogate held
that Reis's dual status "imposed upon him an extraordinary
head-on conflict. His primary duty as an estate fiduciary was to
obtain terms the most advantageous for the estate in its dealings
and negotiations with MNY .... His conflicting duty as a director
of MNY was to bargain precisely in opposition."36 Because Reis
had essentially acted as consignor and consignee of the paint-
2Id,
28 See id. at 270.
27 379 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1975), modified on other grounds, 392
N.Y.S.2d 870 (App. Div.), affd., 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977).
2See id. at 932.
2See id. at 934.
See id. at 933.
"See In re Estate of Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1977).
2See idL
3See id.
See Rothko, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
See id. at 936.
"Id.
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ings, the Surrogate held that he had "benefit[ted] himself indi-
rectly at the expense of the estate," and as a result, had breached
his duty of loyalty, amounting to "the equivalent of self-
dealing." 7
A second conflict of interest arose regarding co-executor
Stamos. Stamos, an artist himself, entered into an individual
contract with MNY to market his own paintings while the con-
signment of the Rothko estate paintings to MNY was still pend-
ing. 8 The court noted that the personal contract was more ad-
vantageous to Stamos individually than the consignment
contracts were to the Rothko estate, since the commission rate
due MNY for Stamos's personal contract was lower than that of
the estate paintings.39 Furthermore, the court observed that
Stamos was allowed, under his own contract with MNY, to fix a
minimum selling price for his paintings. The estate consignment
contracts with MNY contained no such provision.40  Clearly,
then, Stamos was self-dealing by competing with the estate for
the most favorable terms of sale for his own paintings to MNY,
and the Surrogate found that he engaged in a "self-serving
breach of loyalty."4
The "classic ' example of a self-dealing trustee, however, in-
volves a trustee's purchase of trust property in his individual ca-
pacity. A trustee may not sell trust property to himself (or his
spouse)43 privately or by auction, even if the sale is made in good
3 Id. at 940. ("[Reis's] conduct does not amount to self-dealing in the sense of
buying or selling assets directly to or from the estate for his own personal account
...."). For a similar expansive definition of self-dealing which was put forward in the
construction of an exoneration clause, see Interfirst Bank Dallas v. Risser, 739
S.W.2d 882, 899 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) ("[A]ny conduct by the trustee which violates
fiduciary duty by taking advantage of the trustee's position as trustee to benefit the
trustee ... can constitute self-dealing.").
"See Rothko, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 Id. at 941. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the finding of the
Surrogate that both co-executors, Reis and Stamos, had a conflict of interest and
divided loyalty because of their connections to MAG and MNY corporations. Will of
Rothko, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870,872 (App. Div.), affd, 372 N.E.2d 291 (1977).
4In Rothko, the Surrogate seemed to implicitly agree with this categorization
of the classic self-dealing trustee by referring to Reis's breach of the duty of loyalty
as the "equivalent of self-dealing, rather than self-dealing itself. Rothko, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 940; see also text accompanying note 37.
4See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 170(1) cmt. e (stating that a sale of trust
property by the trustee to his spouse is voidable by the beneficiary because such a
sale is considered to be the equivalent of a sale made by the trustee to himself); see
1998]
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faith and for adequate consideration." Arguably, the participa-
tion of a trustee at an auction of the trust corpus involves an in-
herent conflict of interest, since the trustee is forced to "wear two
hats." As a fiduciary acting on behalf of the trust, the trustee's
duty of loyalty mandates that he obtain the highest possible
price for the trust asset being auctioned. However, the trustee
in his individual capacity represents an opposite, competing in-
terest: securing the trust property at the lowest possible price.
The incompatibility of these two roles and the competition sub-
sumed within the auction process would likely cause the trustee
not only to contravene the principle embodied in section 170(1) of
the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, comment b (sale of trust
property to trustee individually),45 but also to run afoul of the
principle contained in comment p (competition with the benefici-
ary)46
Similarly, an individual or corporate trustee may not sell to
the trust property which is being held by the trustee in an indi-
vidual capacity, or property "in which he has a personal interest
of such a substantial nature that it might affect his judgment."47
also In re Minch's Will, 71 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946) (stating that a pre-
sumption of self-dealing arises from a sale of trust property by a trustee to his wife
or father). But see UNIF. TRUSTS ACT § 5, 7B U.L.A. 774 (1985) ("No trustee shall
directly or indirectly buy or sell any property for the trust from or to itself or an af-
fifliate; or from or to a director, officer, or employee of such trustee or of an affiliate;
or from or to a relative, employer, partner, or other business associate.").
4See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 170(1) cmt. b.; see also In re Downing's Es-
tate, 57 A.2d 710, 712 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1948) ("The prohibition against self-dealing is
absolute; where the trustee violates it, good faith or payment of a fair consideration
is not material."); In re Bradley's Estate, 143 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sur. Ct. 1955)
(holding that " 'it is immaterial that the trustee acts in good faith in purchasing
trust property for himself, and that he pays a fair consideration' ").
'5 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 170(1) cmt. b; accord A. SCOTT & W.
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170.4 (4th ed. 1988) [hereinafter SCOTT &
FRATCHER, LAW ON TRUSTS].
[A] trustee ... cannot sell to himself at a public auction. The duty of the
trustee in conducting the sale is to obtain as high a price as possible, but if
he is allowed to purchase for himself at the sale it would be to his interest
to have the property sold at the lowest possible price. The trustee is in a
position where he can depreciate the sale, either by discouraging the at-
tendance of bidders or by discouraging their bids. In view of the dangers
resulting from this conflict of duty and interest, the sale will be set aside
even though in fact it appears that the trustee did his best to sell at the
highest price.
"See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 170(1) cmt. p.
47 Id. § 170(1), cmt. h.
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In In re Downing's Estate,48 a commercial bank assigned its in-
terest in a mortgage to a trust for which it was serving as corpo-
rate trustee.49 The mortgagor subsequently defaulted, causing
the estate to suffer a loss." Upholding the decision of the or-
phans' court to surcharge the corporate trustee for the losses in-
curred by the estate, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that
"[a] bank acting as trustee violates its duty to the beneficiary or
trust estate and the rule forbidding self-dealing where it pur-
chases mortgages for the trust which it formerly held in its
commercial department."5'
The court reasoned that the self-dealing rule, which prohib-
its a trustee from purchasing his own property on behalf of the
trust, is not limited to property which the trustee owns indi-
vidually. 2 A trustee's purchase of property from an entity in
which he has substantial ownership or control will also contra-
vene the rule against self-dealing.53 The Downing court included
within the ambit of "substantial interest" both proprietary rights
less than full ownership, such as the interest of a mortgagee or
pledgee in the pledged' or mortgaged property,55 as well as a
controlling or substantial interest of the trustee in the corpora-
tion which owned the property.6 Moreover, the court opined that
"[tihe question is not whether the trustee's substantial interest
[in the property sold] did affect his judgment, but whether this
interest is of such a substantial nature that it might affect his
judgment.""7
48 57 A.2d 710 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1948).
49 See id. at 711.
0 See id. at 712.5 1Id.
2 See id.
See id. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, §170(1) cmt. h (discussing
the possibility that the judgment of the trustee would be clouded by self-dealing in
individual property where the trustee has a substantial personal interest).
"See Coster v. Crookham, 468 N.W.2d 802, 807 (Iowa 1991) (holding that under
Iowa statute prohibiting self-dealing, a pledge of collateral is a constructive sale of
the collateral "even though no foreclosure occurred") (citing Securities Investor Pro-
tection Corp. v. Vigman, 803 F. 2d 1513, 1518 (9th Cir. 1986)).
See Downing, 57 A.2d at 712.
"See id.; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 170(1) cmt. h (contending a
violation of duty when a trustee self-deals in property owned by a corporation where
the trustee has a substantial interest).
Downing, 57 A.2d at 713 (emphasis added). For an especially strident denun-
ciation of this aspect of the self-dealing rule, see Louis C. Haggerty, Conflicting In-
terests of Estate Fiduciaries in New York and the "No Further Inquiry" Rule, 18
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4 (1949) ([A] fiduciary who sells or buys from any relative by
1998]
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Subsumed within this dialectic between the phrases "might
affect" and "did affect" is the ratio leges of the rule against self-
dealing by a trustee. The rule against self-dealing is a deterrent
and prophylactic rule. Its application is not dependent upon the
trustee's unjust enrichment,58 nor will a trustee escape liability
by contending that the self-serving transaction was carried out
in good faith. 9 As stated, "[t]he principal object of the admini-
stration of the rule is preventative, to make the disobedience of
the trustee to the rule so prejudicial to him that he and all other
trustees will be induced to avoid disloyal transactions in the fu-
ture."' Consequently, if a corporate trustee purchased for the
trust shares of stock owned by the corporation's commercial de-
partment, it would contravene the self-dealing rule since "there
would be a temptation to consider ... [the corporation's] advan-
tage in making the [purchase] and not ... solely the ... [interests
of] the beneficiaries .... "1 By engaging in such self-dealing, the
corporate trustee places itself in a position wherein its interests
were, or might be, in conflict with those of the beneficiary. 2
blood or marriage or any business associate is asking for trouble.").
8See GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 543, at 247 (2d ed. 1993).
69 See id6o Id at 246-47.
61 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 170(1) cmt. i, illus. 3, at 368; see also UNIF.
TRUSTS ACT § 7, 7B U.L.A. 778 (1985) (stating that "Mo corporate trustee shall pur-
chase for a trust shares of its own stock, or its bonds or other securities, or the
stock, bonds or other securities of an affiliate").
6See In re Ryan's Will, 52 N.E.2d 909, 922 (N.Y. 1943). The rule proscribing a
corporate trustee's purchase of property owned by the corporation, and policy con-
siderations in support of this rule are also applicable to transactions made by a cor-
porate trustee with its affiliate or subsidiary. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, §
170(1) cmt. i, illus. 4 & 5. In Ryan, a trust company owned certain mortgages, and
sought to invest trust funds in those mortgages by assigning the mortgages to an
affiliate who would immediately reassign the mortgages back to the trust company
as trustee, all as part of one transaction. Ryan, 52 N.E.2d at 915. There was no evi-
dence that the affiliate ever had ownership of the mortgages. See id. at 922. The
court held that the assignment and subsequent reassignment of the mortgage be-
tween the trust company and the affiliate on the same day as part of the same
transaction, coupled with the fact that title to the mortgage was never transferred
to the affiliate, constituted a self-dealing transaction made between the trust com-
panypro se and the trust company as trustee. See id. Self-dealing by a trustee is ab-
solutely proscribed to "avoid the possibility of fraud and to avoid the temptation of
self-interest." I& at 923. The court further held that this rule against self-dealing
may not be circumvented by conducting transactions through an affiliate. See id.
[Vol. 72:43
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A. The Voidable Self-Dealing Transaction. What can a
Beneficiary do?
Having set forth the predominant variations of self-dealing
transactions, a second question remains as to the effect of a trus-
tee's self-dealing upon the underlying transaction.
1. The "No Further Inquiry" Rule.
Historically, courts had employed the "no further inquiry"
rule to manifest their unequivocal condemnation of a trustee's
breach of loyalty. In In re Kilmer's Will,6 the executors, in ac-
cordance with their powers set forth in the testator's will, offered
certain estate premises for sale in order to finance the payment
of taxes.6 Though the executors had received a bid on the prop-
erty, one of the executors attempted to solicit a different buyer
and offered to match the purchase price if his new prospect did
not materialize. 66 The executor's prospective buyer did not ma-
terialize, and the executor eventually purchased the estate prop-
erty in his individual capacity.'
In voiding the transaction as being a sale of property by the
executors to "one of their own," the Surrogate observed that
through the "no further inquiry" rule, the law implements a
0 See Haggerty, supra note 57, at 19. The author argues against the implemen-
tation of the "no further inquiry" rule:
The "no further inquiry" rule is of a different character. The proclamation
in the Munson case that the court will not inquire into considerations of
abstract justice in a case involving a transaction between a fiduciary and
himself is pietistic rather than morally sound .... A feeling of self-
righteousness and a glow of self-satisfaction, not too far removed from
smugness, are apt to accompany the denunciation of ill-advised conduct on
the part of others ....
it is by its own nature, an acknowledgment of weakness, as it is based on
the fear of an inability to determine the true rights of the parties involved.
This fear of course, may have been justified in 1886 when the Munson
opinion was written .... But today [19491, with all the books and records
which must be kept and with all the powers of examination and of inspec-
tion which may be envoked [sic], neither the courts nor the parties are
helpless .... There is no reason why the abstract justice of a case should not
at least be inquired into ... when the good faith of a fiduciary is estab-
lished.
Id.
.61 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sur. Ct. Broome County 1946).
6 Id. at 53.
6 See id at 53-54.
6 See id. at 54.
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principle prohibiting fiduciary self-dealing by granting to the
beneficiary the option to set aside any transfer by the fiduciary
to himself." The court reasoned that in such a case:
The law 'does not stop to inquire whether the contract of trans-
action was fair or unfair. It stops the inquiry when the relation
is disclosed, and sets aside the transaction or refuses to enforce
it, at the instance of the party whom the fiduciary undertook to
represent, without undertaking to deal with the question of ab-
stract justice in the particular case.'6 9
The court went on to note that even though the "no further
inquiry" rule invalidates self-dealing transactions at the benefi-
ciary's option, the transaction itself is not void, but only void-
able.7" In addition, the beneficiary's right to set aside the trans-
action is subject to the equitable defenses of laches, ratification,
and consent.7' Furthermore, the settlor's authorization of the
otherwise proscribed self-dealing transaction can take the form
of an express exculpatory clause in the trust instrument.72
2. Liability Of Trustee To Beneficiary For Self-Dealing
Transaction; Measure Of Damages
An aggrieved beneficiary is not only entitled to petition a
court to avoid a self-dealing transaction, but may also move to
have a trustee surcharged for any loss to the estate resulting
from the self-dealing transaction. In In re Tannenbaum's Will,
7
Id. at 55 (noting that injection of the fiduciary's self-interest is prevented by
"granting to the party to whom the fiduciary duty is owed an approximately un-
qualified option to avoid any transfer by the fiduciary to himself').
Id. at 56 (quoting Wendt v. Fisher, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (N.Y. 1926)).
70 Id. at 57 (noting that even if the sale is voidable, it is only voidable upon the
election of objecting respondents). In In re Estate of Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y.
1977), the court of appeals differentiated between a void and voidable transaction:
Where a contract is voidable on both sides, [because of a trustee's self-
dealing] ... the transaction is not wholly void, since in order to prevent the
contract from having its normal operation the claim or defense must in
some manner be asserted and also since the contract is capable of ratifica-
tion, such a contract affects from the outset the legal relations of the par-
ties.
Id. (citing 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 15, at 28-
29 (Walter H.E. Jaeger, ed., 3d ed. 1959)).
71 See Kilmer's Will, 61 N.Y.S.2d at 57 (discussing circumstances where it would
be inequitable to deem a sales transaction void).
72See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
73 219 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1961), modified sub nom., In re Estate
of Tannenbaum, 248 N.Y.S.2d 749 (App. Div. 1964), affd, 205 N.E.2d 866 (N.Y.
1965).
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the testator's will directed his executors, including his widow, to
liquidate his clothing business as soon as practicable after testa-
tor's death.74 Notwithstanding this provision of the will, the tes-
tator's widow and co-executrix of his estate continued the busi-
ness in her individual capacity and also purchased shares in the
business from the other executors. 5 The Surrogate held that the
co-executrix widow's acquisition of the business and her pur-
chase of the shares from the other co-executors were improper
self-dealing and surcharged the executors for the value of the
goodwill of the business and for the profits earned by the widow-
executrix in continuing the testator's business.7 The Surrogate
reasoned that:
When certain action would be for the best interests of the estate,
but possibly involve personal gain or technical conflict of inter-
est, the fiduciary must not proceed without prior authority from
the Court upon a proper showing. Good faith will not absolve
him from the consequences of a violation of his duty .... The
consequences [to the trustee] are that any resulting loss to the
estate must fall upon his shoulders though his motives be inno-
cent, and any profit derived from the action will inure to the
benefit of the estate without any compensation for his fruitful
77efforts, subjecting him to surcharge in either case.
The guiding principle by which the court fixes damages in
the event of a trustee's self-dealing transaction is "the rule that
-the beneficiaries are entitled to be put in the position which they
would have occupied if no breach of duty had been committed. 8
Thus, a beneficiary has three alternative remedies against a self-
dealing trustee. First, the trustee is charged with any loss to the
trust estate. Second, the trustee is charged with any profit ac-
tually made by the trustee through the breach of trust. Third,
the beneficiary may recover from the trustee any lost profits
which would have accrued to the estate had there been no such
breach of trust. 9
7 See id. at 151 (noting that the will directed the executors "to liquidate, as soon
as may be practicable after my demise, my business now ... or any other business of
which I may be the individual owner at the time of my death").
76 See id. at 154 (discussing the decision of the testator's widow to continue the
business because of her determination that the business had no goodwill).
76 See id. at 156.
7Id. at 153.
78 In re Estate of Rothko, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 965. (citing 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN
SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 205 (3d ed. 1967)) [hereinafter SCOTT ON TRUSTS].
79 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, §§ 205, 206; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
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Furthermore, if a self-dealing trustee has transferred trust
property to a third person, a beneficiary has the right to follow,
or "trace," the property into the hands of such third person, un-
less such third person is a bona fide purchaser.80 Moreover, if
the trustee has reinvested the trust proceeds into a new,
ON TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a (1992) (incorporating the provisions of the Prudent Investor
Rule); see, e.g., In re Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d 332, 339 (N.Y. 1997) (noting that
the "lost profits" or "market index" measure of damages is applicable to a case of
"deliberate self-dealing and faithless transfers of trust property").
80 See Rothko, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 965 (citation omitted). New York Estates, Powers
and Trusts Law ("EPTL"), section 7-3.2 provides, in pertinent part:
7-3.2. Bona fide purchasers and creditors protected.
An express trust not declared in the disposition to the trustee or an
implied or resulting trust does not defeat the title of a purchaser from
the trustee for value and without notice of the trust, or the rights of a
creditor who extended credit to the trustee in reliance upon his appar-
ent ownership of the trust property.
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-3.2 (McKinney 1992); see also Kirsch v. Tozier,
38 N.E. 375, 376 (N.Y. 1894) (noting that in New York, a person dealing with a trus-
tee needs to inquire as to the scope of the trustee's authority). If the instrument
creating the transaction refers to the trust, and the transaction is ultra vires of the
trust provisions, the transaction is void. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-
2.4 (McKinney 1992). Accordingly, a third party cannot be absolved of liability when
it is dealing with a patently self-dealing trustee. See In re Pepi, N.Y. L.J., June 19,
1996, at 30 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1996) (holding that a credit company dealing
with a trustee is chargeable with knowledge of all of the trust provisions including
the duty to hold and manage the property for the benefit of the beneficiaries). If the
trust instrument grants the trustee broad powers it still "cannot absolve a third
party transacting business with ... [a blatantly self-dealing] trustee." Id. In such a
case, where the bona fide purchaser rule is inapplicable because the transaction is
void ab initio, the beneficiary's remedy should be tracing the property in kind. See
United States v. Dunn, 268 U.S. 121, 132 (1925) (holding that a "beneficiary of a
trust may ... follow the trust res fraudulently diverted until it reaches the hands of
an innocent purchaser"). In contradiction to the EPTL's "objective" position regard-
ing the duty of a third party to inquire as to the trustee's powers, section 7 of the
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act has no such duty of inquiry. UNIF. TRUSTEES'
POWERS ACT, § 7, 7B U.L.A. 758 provides, in pertinent part:
With respect to a third person dealing with a trustee or assisting a trustee
in the conduct of a transaction, the existence of trust power and their
proper exercise by the trustee may be assumed without inquiry. The third
person is not bound to inquire whether the trustee has power to act or is
properly exercising the power; and a third person, without actual knowl-
edge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly exercising
them, is fully protected in dealing with the trustee as if the trustee pos-
sessed and properly exercised the powers he purports to exercise.
Id.
Clearly, the position of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act is predicated solely
on the subjective knowledge of the third party. If the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act
subjective standard was to be applied to the facts of the Pepi case, the credit com-
pany could have been considered a bona fide lender because it did not have actual
knowledge that the transaction involved a trustee's self-dealing.
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"traceable" investment, the beneficiary has the option to follow
such proceeds into the new investment or to hold the trustee
personally liable for the proceeds."'
II. THE EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF EXCULPATORY CLAUSES
A. Construction of Exculpatory Clauses Permitting Self-Dealing
A settlor may specifically authorize a trustee's otherwise
voidable self-dealing transaction.82 This explicit authorization
for self-dealing may be accomplished by careful drafting of a so-
called exculpatory or exoneration clause. Whereas a court apply-
ing the "no further inquiry" rule will set aside a self-dealing
transaction at the behest of the beneficiary-without weighing
the merits or good faith of the individual transaction-an excul-
patory clause will reduce the standard of a trustee's duty from
utmost loyalty to good faith, thereby permitting a court to in-
quire into the propriety of the individual transaction8
In the case of Renz v. Beeman,' three members of the Pruyn
family made an agreement in 1954 to create three inter vivos
trusts in a single instrument." Together, the three trusts held a
majority of the 8,000 voting preferred shares of Finch-Pruyn, a
closely held corporation. 6 The defendant, Mrs. Beeman, acted as
co-trustee and beneficiary of the trusts together with her hus-
band, who also served as president of Finch-Pruyn.1 In 1958, a
Finch family member died and bequeathed 2,000 shares of voting
preferred and 6,300 shares of non-voting common stock of Finch-
Pruyn to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City.Y
The museum's agent contacted the president of Finch-Pruyn to
negotiate a sale of the stock.89 Thereafter, in 1962, the corpora-
8' See Rothko, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 965 ("If the fiduciary has invested the property or
its proceeds into any other property into which it can be distinctly traced, the bene-
ficiary also has an election, either to follow the same into the new investment, or to
hold the fiduciary personally liable for the breach.").
82 See RESTATEMENT supra note 3, § 170(1) cmt. a.
"' See, e.g., Renz v. Beeman, 589 F.2d 735, 744-45 (2d Cir. 1978).
84id
See id. at 741.
See id. (noting that the new trust held "a majority of the outstanding shares.")
(emphasis omitted).
See id at 740-43.
8See id. at 741-42.
"See id. at 742 (noting that the district court characterized an exchange of a
series of letters as the " 'initial steps toward negotiating the purchase of the ...
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tion purchased the non-voting common stock and Mrs. Beeman
purchased the 2,000 voting preferred shares individually, not
adding them to the 1954 trusts.9
In 1969, Mrs. Beeman created a trust with her brother and
deposited into the trust 2,360 shares of voting preferred shares
she held individually (including the 2,000 shares from the 1962
purchase) and her brother contributed 888.8 shares of voting
preferred shares.9' Mrs. Beeman also agreed to exercise her tes-
tamentary power of appointment under the 1954 trust to trans-
fer her beneficial interest in 777.8 shares of voting stock to the
new trust.92 This act in effect shifted control from the 1954 trust
to the new trust because the new trust then held a majority of
the 8,000 voting shares of Finch-Pruyn." A beneficiary of the
1954 trust sued to impose a constructive trust on the 2,000 vot-
ing shares purchased by Mrs. Beeman in her individual capacity,
so as to restore the balance of ownership of the Finch-Pruyn
stock in the 1954 trust."
The district court held, inter alia, that the purchase of stock
by a co-trustee individually was within the discretion afforded to
the trustees by the exculpatory language in the trust agree-
ments." Accordingly, in dismissing the beneficiary's complaint,
the court applied a good faith standard to the trustee's purchase
of the stock instead of the undivided duty of loyalty standard
usually applied to self-dealing transactions."
The Second Circuit vacated the dismissal of the complaint,
holding, in part, that the district court utilized the wrong stan-
dard to evaluate the trustees' self-dealing purchase of voting pre-
ferred shares. 7 The court examined the terms of the trust to as-
certain whether the instrument authorized the self-dealing stock
purchase.9 The trust agreement was found to have granted wide
managerial powers to the trustees, including powers "to vote the
stock, to retain or sell trust property, to enter into various busi-
stock.' ").
go See id.
91 See id. at 742-43.
92 See id. at 743.
93 See id. at 743.
" See id at 739 (holding that a good faith standard should be employed because
of the exculpatory provision in the 1954 trust agreement).
5See id at 743.
9See id. at 744.
"See id. at 745.
" See id. at 743-44.
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ness arrangements with others ... and generally 'to do all such
acts, take all such proceedings, and exercise all such rights and
privileges ... as if [he were] the absolute owner thereof.' " The
exculpatory clause stated:
[Tihe decision of the Trustees with respect to the exercise or
non-exercise by them of any discretionary power hereunder, or
the time or manner of the exercise thereof, made in good faith,
shall fully protect them and shall be conclusive and binding
upon all persons interested in the trust estate.'00
The Second Circuit observed that an exculpatory clause can
reduce a trustee's duty of utmost loyalty to that of good faith, a
standard which would enable a court to examine the merits of a
particular transaction.0 ' Nevertheless, the court emphasized
that an exculpatory provision must be drafted with explicit lan-
guage in order to lower the standard, and that courts may not
broadly construe the language "lest they unwittingly permit
erosion of the fiduciary duty itself." 102 Therefore, because there
was no such provision in the trust agreement explicitly granting
the trustees the right to engage in a self-interested transaction,
the trustee was not protected by the exculpatory clause. Conse-
09 Id. at 741 (quoting the trust agreement).
100 Id. (quoting the exculpatory clause in the trust agreement).
101 See id. at 744-45; cf. In re Estate of Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291, 295 (N.Y. 1977)
(determining the proper legal standard in voiding an estate contract). In Rothko, the
court rejected appellants' contention that the surrogate's court and the appellate
division incorrectly applied the "no further inquiry" rule to a non-self-dealing trans-
action, and that the courts should have examined the fairness of the transaction to
determine whether a breach of fiduciary duty occurred. Id. The court found that the
appellate division and the Surrogate did not rely exclusively on the "no further in-
quiry" rule, and that there was "more than an adequate basis to conclude" that the
transactions were unfair. See id. at 296. However, the court of appeals made no ref-
erence to the Surrogate's characterization of the Reis transactions as "equivalent to
self-dealing." Hence, the court did not squarely address the question of whether the
"no further inquiry" rule is applicable only to self-dealing transactions. Arguably,
the court of appeals merely noted the utilization of both the "good faith" and "no fur-
ther inquiry" standards in the lower courts' decisions, but made no attempt to iden-
tify the proscribed fiduciary conduct to which either standard might be applied.
102 Renz, 589 F.2d at 745; see In re Will of Heidenreich, 378 N.Y.S.2d 982, 985
(Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1976). In Heidenreich, the court held that the trust agree-
ment specifically authorized trustees to engage in self-dealing transactions. Id. The
court stated that as long as trustees did not act in bad faith-which they did not-
they were absolved from liability with respect to the transaction. See id.; see also
Public Serv. Co. of Colorado v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 577 F. Supp. 92, 102
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that "[tlhe [clourt will not strain the language of the [trust]
agreement to find an exculpatory provision neither fairly implied by the language
nor consistent with the relationship between the parties").
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quently, the higher duty of undivided loyalty, and not the good
faith standard, applied to the transaction,113 and the trustee vio-
lated this higher duty when she purchased the stock individually
rather than offering it for sale to the trust or its beneficiaries.'
0 4
Similarly, in In re Durston's Will,"0 5 shares of the corporate
trustee formed part of the testator's estate. The trustees re-
tained these shares of their own trust company and purchased
additional shares with estate funds.'0 The New York Court of
Appeals held that such retention and purchase of the Syracuse
Trust Company's own shares, without a clause in the will spe-
cifically authorizing such actions, constituted self-dealing. 17 The
trustees' argument that an exculpatory clause in the will had
authorized these transactions was rejected by the court:
We may not infer from broad grants of power "to hold, care for,
manage and control" the trust estate; "to sell and convert into
money any part or all thereof ..., to invest or reinvest the same,
or portions thereof, in such interest bearing or income producing
securities or property as to the said trustees, in the exercise of
their discretion may seem best," that such authority was to be
exercised without regard to the fundamental duties and loyal-
ties imposed upon all trustees .... 108
If the testator had intended to authorize self-dealing trans-
actions and thereby waive the undivided loyalty rule as applied
to such fiduciary relationship, "the authority should have been
stated."' The court further held that a power, however broad,
103 See Renz, 589 F.2d at 745.
10 See id. at 748. The court emphasized how the trustee, in her role as a fiduci-
ary, should have put the interests of the trust ahead of her personal interests. See
id. The court stated that "[ain opportunity for purchase that comes to [her] while in
a fiduciary capacity compels the trustee to give a right of first refusal to [her] trust
estate if the opportunity fits the purpose of the trust." Id. at 746 (citing Wootten v.
Wootten, 151 F.2d 147, 150 (10th Cir. 1945)).10 74 N.E.2d 310 (N.Y. 1947).
106 See id. at 312.
'0 See id. at 313.
108 Id Although broad discretionary powers were granted to the trustees in their
administration of the trust, the clause did not explicitly grant authority to engage in
transactions involving competing interests of the trust and the personal interests of
the trustees. See id.; see also Benedict v. Amaducci, No. 92 Civ. 5239 (KMW) 1993
WL 87937, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that even if trustees granted broad dis-
cretionary powers in the administration of trusts, the rule of undivided loyalty is
neither lessened nor abolished).
108 Durston's Will, 74 N.E.2d at 313; see also Kinney v. Lindgren, 26 N.E.2d 471,
474 (111. 1940) (holding that officers of a trust company who were also trustees of the
trust fund that originally held the shares of the trust company were not given ex-
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that is conferred upon a trustee, must not be exercised in such a
manner so as to violate the duty to the beneficiaries.11
Paralleling the decision of the New York courts, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court in In re Anneke's Trust"' construed a trust
instrument as not having explicitly authorized self-dealing by
the trustee-bank." During the administration of the Anneke
trust, the trustee-bank purchased, with trust money, securities
owned by its own trust department, which resulted in a profit to
the bank."' The court addressed the issue of whether in estab-
lishing the terms of the trust, the settlor had authorized the
bank to purchase securities from itself."'
The relevant trust provision provided that the trustee "in
case of an investment under the provisions hereof in securities
held by it, shall be entitled to the regular commission or under-
writing profits of its Bond Department on the sale of such secu-
rities."" 5 The trustee argued that the words "held by it" meant
"owned by it" and that the section, when read together with the
rest of the trust instrument, evinced an intent by the settlor to
authorize the self-dealing transaction."' The court held that it
would not "read into the instrument, by implication, a waiver of
a rule ... so well established and so strictly applied as ... [the
rule] against self-dealing by a fiduciary.""7  If the attorney-
draftsman of the instrument had intended to authorize self-
press authority to purchase more shares of the trust company with funds, and
therefore breached the fiduciary duty owed to the beneficiary); In re Estate of
McCredy, 470 A.2d 585, 600-01 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (holding that although the
trustee engaged in self-dealing, the terms of the exoneration clause combined with
testatrixs knowledge of the trustee's conflict of interest constituted a waiver of the
application of the rule of undivided loyalty). In Kinney, because the trustee pur-
chased trust company bonds at face value knowing that their actual value was sub-
stantially lower, the decision could also have been predicated upon the trustee's bad
faith and not solely on the terms of the trust agreement. See Ledbetter v. First State
Bank and Trust Co., 85 F.3d 1537, 1544 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that if a trustee is
given authority to retain stock received from the trustor as investment in the trust,
trustee must act in good faith and not abuse his discretion) (quoting SCOTT ON
TRUSTS § 187, supra note 78).
110 See Durston's, 74 N.E.2d at 313 (citing Carrier v. Carrier, 123 N.E. 135, 139
(N.Y. 1919) and RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 186 cmt. f (1935)).
... 38 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. 1949).
12 See id. at 183.
113 See id. at 179.
114 See Ud at 179.
15 Id. at 180 (alteration in original) (quoting trust agreement).
116 Id.
"7 Id at 183.
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dealing, he would have done so in "clear and unmistakable lan-
guage."1"' Since there was no such clear and unmistakable lan-
guage in the trust agreement, the court was compelled to
"construe the contract strictly against a meaning that will read
into the instrument, by implication, an intention to grant such
authority." 19
What is the "clear and unmistakable" language that the An-
neke court required? A later Minnesota case, In re Kemske,1 20
which cited and followed Anneke, seemed to illustrate the "clear
and unmistakable" language necessary for a valid exoneration
clause. In Kemske, the settlor created a trust initially funded
with shares of stock in a mutual fund which had been adminis-
tered by the trustee-bank's parent company.21 The trust was
drafted by a Mr. Somsen, an attorney and friend of the settlor
and also a director and shareholder in the parent company.122 At
the trustee-bank's insistence, Somsen had inserted an exonera-
tion clause relieving the trustee-bank from liability for self-
dealing.' The settlor had invested in the mutual fund until his
death.' Thereafter, the trustee-bank continued to invest trust
funds in its parent company's mutual fund.'
The beneficiaries of the trust petitioned the court to sur-
charge the trustee-bank for self-dealing. 12  The Minnesota Su-
preme Court, in affirming the district court's order denying the
surcharges, held that the exoneration provision had authorized
the trustee-bank to deal in the mutual fund shares of the parent
company. m' The court reasoned that a settlor may waive the
law's protection against self-dealing in clear and unmistakable
language and the exoneration provision was found to contain
118 Id.
19 Id
1'20 305 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981).
121 See id. at 757-58
122 See id.
See id at 758.
12 See id. at 758.
1'2 See id.
126 See id. at 757.
127 See id. at 760. The exoneration clause provided, inter alia, that:
Trustor is aware that trustee is presently owned by State Bond and Mort-
gage Company and power to invest in it or in stocks of corporations owned
or managed by it or in which it may have any interest whatever is given
expressly for the purpose of averting and waiving any prohibitions upon
such investment which might exist in the absence of such power.
Id. at 758.
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such language as required by the Anneke court.'
Several problematic aspects to the Kemske decision seem to
have been overlooked by the majority's decision. For example, a
dissenting opinion argued that the exoneration clause did not go
far enough in meeting the clear and unmistakable language
standard articulated by the Anneke court. The minority would
have required that:
[T]he trustee draft an instrument that clearly explains the na-
ture and extent of the conflict and the financial benefit that may
accrue to the trustee as a result of the conflict. In this case, it
would have been possible, even by separate letter signed and
acknowledged by the settlor, to identify briefly and clearly the
potential conflicts, to give an indication of how the trustee
would benefit from investments with affiliated entities, and to
indicate the anticipated extent to which trust funds would be
invested with affiliated entities.'
In addition, neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions
addressed the issue of the conduct of Mr. Somsen, Kemske's at-
torney. Somsen was the draftsman of the trust agreement,
which incorporated an exoneration clause relieving the trustee-
bank of liability for self-dealing. 3 ' This clause was inserted, at
the co-trustee-bank's request, by an attorney who himself was
encumbered by a conflict of interest. When Somsen accepted the
attorney's fee for drafting the trust, he was Kemske's counsel
and had a fiduciary duty to draft the trust in Kemske's best in-
terest. However, Somsen inserted an exoneration clause that
was in the best interest of the trustee-bank and parent corpora-
tion, of which Somsen was a director and shareholder. There
was no indication in either the majority or dissenting opinions
that Kemske was informed of the conflict, although Kemske
signed the trust. Clearly, the attorney wore two hats in this
transaction and violated the fiduciary duty that he owed to his
client.13
1
m See id& at 760.
'Id. at 764 (Yetka, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).0 See id. at 757.
131 See, e.g., N.Y. CODE OF PROFEsSIONAL REsPONsIBILITY, EC 5-3 (McKinney
Supp. 1997). Ethical Consideration 5-3 provides, in pertinent part:
EC 5-3. Even if the property interests of a lawyer do not presently interfere
with the exercise of independent judgment, but the likelihood of interfer-
ence can be reasonably foreseen by the lawyer, a lawyer should explain the
situation to the client and should decline employment or withdraw unless
the client consents to the continuance of the relationship after full disclo-
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The minority's position in Kemske seems to provide a solu-
tion to the attorney's conflict of interest as well as the parent
corporation's self-dealing. Perhaps, to apply the principle em-
bodied in the minority's opinion, the settlor's attorney should
have drafted, and had the settlor execute, a disclosure document
analogous to that required by the New York Surrogate's Court
Procedure Act, section 2307-a."2 Absent the disclosure require-
ments suggested by the minority position and as set forth in N.Y.
S.C.P.A. 2307-a, the attorney in this case appears to have en-
gaged in a more egregious and insidious act of self-dealing than
that alleged to have been committed by the corporation itself. In
fact, the Minnesota Supreme Court has disbarred attorneys who
have engaged in self-dealing transactions while representing cli-
ents.3
sure.
2 N.Y. SUR. CT. PROC. ACT § 2307-a (McKinney 1997). Section 2307-a of the
Act provides, in pertinent part:
§2307-a. Commissions of an attorney-executor
1. Disclosure. When an attorney prepares a will to be proved in the
courts of this state and such attorney or a then affiliated attorney is
therein an executor-designee, the testator shall be informed prior to
the execution of the will that:
(a) subject to limited statutory exceptions, any person, including
an attorney, is eligible to serve as an executor;
(b) absent an agreement to the contrary, any person, including an
attorney, who serves as an executor is entitled to receive an ex-
ecutor's statutory commissions; and
(c) if such attorney or an affiliated attorney renders legal services
in connection with the executor's official duties, such attorney or a
then affiliated attorney is entitled to receive just and reasonable
compensation for such legal services, in addition to the executor's
statutory commissions.
2. Testator's written acknowledgment of disclosure. An acknowledg-
ment by the testator of the disclosure required by subdivision 1 of this
section must be set forth in a writing executed by the testator in the
presence of at least one witness other than the executor-designee.
Such writing may be executed prior to, concurrently with or subse-
quently to a will in which an attorney or a then affiliated attorney is
an executor-designee and must be filed in the proceeding for the issu-
ance of letters testamentary to the executor-designee.
Id
i See, e.g., In re Perry, 494 N.W.2d 290, 292 (Minn. 1992) (disbarring attorney
for "failing to inform his [client] of the conflict of interest that resulted from acting
as her fiduciary and trustee of the ... trust while appropriating substantial trust
funds for his own benefit"); In re Olson, 358 N.W.2d 662, 663 (Minn. 1984)
(disbarring attorney for self-dealing and conversion of assets, as well as other acts);
In re Franke, 345 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 1984) (disbarring attorney for, among other
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III. GOOD FAITH EXERCISE OF POWER IN INSTRUMENT
PERMITTING SELF-DEALING
Even if the trust instrument contains a clear, unmistakable,
and explicit exculpatory clause granting the trustee power to
self-deal, that power must be exercised in good faith. In O'Hayer
v. de St. Aubin,1" the trust instrument contained an express ex-
culpatory clause authorizing the trustee to purchase stock from
the trust corpus as well as explicitly exonerating the trustee
from any liability for self-dealing."5 The beneficiary sued the
trustee's executors to set aside a sale of shares held by the trust
to the trustee.'36 In affirming the judgment of the Westchester
County Supreme Court, the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment held that the language in the exoneration clause permitted
self-dealing of the trust corpus by the trustee.3 7 Nevertheless,
the court recognized that the existence of an exoneration clause
"[does not] say that the settlor's directions allow the trustee free
rein to deal with the trust; the law interposes to require that the
trustee always exercise good faith in his administration."" In
support of this reasoning, the court cited section 222.3 of Scott on
Trusts: " 'No matter how broad the [exoneration] provision may
be, the trustee is liable if he commits a breach of trust in bad
faith or intentionally or with reckless indifference to the inter-
ests of the beneficiaries, or if he has personally profited through
a breach of trust.' "13
Despite the court's ostensible reliance upon section 222.3 of
Scott on Trusts, the court nonetheless held that "[t]he settlor in
express language provided that the general rule prohibiting in-
dividual profit by the trustee should not apply ..... 0 The court
predicated its holding upon section 170.9 of Scott on Trusts,
which it cited approvingly in the very same paragraph where it
had set forth section 222.3." It is submitted that the court erred
in relying on section 222.3, which prohibits exoneration clauses
things, self-dealing and stating that the attorney "engaged in the most egregious
conduct by drafting documents for his self-interest.").
l" 293 N.Y.S.2d 147 (App. Div. 1968).
13See id. at 151, 158.
1s See id. at 149.
'3 See id at 151-52.
11 Id at 151.
I (quoting SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 78, § 222.3).
140 I
141 See id.
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authorizing self-dealing transactions, and instead should have
relied exclusively upon section 170.9 of Scott's treatise, which
sanctions clauses expressly permitting trustees to profit from
self-dealing transactions." If the court did not err in its quoting
of both sections of Scott on Trusts, then the court's holding is
seemingly inconsistent with its reasoning. It is further submit-
ted that sections 170.9 and 222.3 of Scott on Trusts are contra-
dictory, since both sections provide opposing views of whether a
settlor, by the terms of the trust, can explicitly authorize a trus-
tee to profit from a self-dealing transaction.
A. Contradiction Between Restatement (Second) Of Trusts
Sections 170 and 222
Arguably, the source of the problem regarding the propriety
of an exoneration clause permitting self-dealing, and personal
profiting by a trustee, is neither the O'Hayer decision, nor the
two inconsistent sections of Scott on Trusts, but rather the text
and comment of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts itself. The
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, section 170(1), comment a, ex-
pressly provides that "as to matters within the scope of the
[fiduciary] relation ... [a trustee] is under a duty not to profit at
the expense of the beneficiary and not to enter into competition
with him without his consent, unless authorized to do so by the
terms of the trust .... "'4 Similarly, in comment t to section
170(1), the Restatement (Second) of Trusts expressly permits
clauses authorizing self-dealing transactions:
t. Terms of the trust. By the terms of the trust the trustee may
be permitted to sell trust property to himself individually, or as
trustee to purchase property from himself individually, or to
lend to himself money held by him in trust, or otherwise to deal
with the trust property on his own account. The trustee violates
his duty to the beneficiary, however, if he acts in bad faith, no
matter how broad may be the provisions of the terms of the
trust in conferring power upon him to deal with the trust prop-
erty on his own account.'"
Notwithstanding the position set forth in section 170(1)
42 See SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 78, § 170.9 ("By the terms of the trust the
trustee may be permitted to do what in the absence of such a provision in the trust
instrument would be a violation of his duty of loyalty.").
143 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 170(1) cmt. a.
1" IdM §170(1) cmt. t.
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authorizing clauses for self-dealing transactions, section 222(2)
of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, and comment b thereto,
expressly proscribe exculpatory clauses:
§ 222. Exculpatory Provisions
(1) Except as stated in Subsections (2) and (3), the trustee,
by provisions in the terms of the trust, can be relieved of li-
ability for breach of trust.
(2) A provision in the trust instrument is not effective to re-
lieve the trustee of liability for breach of trust committed in
bad faith or intentionally or with reckless indifference to the
interest of the beneficiary, or of liability for any profit which
the trustee has derived from a breach of trust.
145
Comment b on Subsection (2), provides, in pertinent part:
b. Extent to which exculpatory provisions against public policy.
No provision in the terms of the trust is effective to relieve
the trustee who derives a profit from a breach of trust from
liability to the extent of the profit. Such provisions as these
are invalid on the ground that it would be contrary to public
policy to give effect to them. 46
It would seem that the correct rule of law is contained in
section 170(1) comments a and t of the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts, and that the rule incorporated in the contradictory sec-
tion 222(2) and comment b reflects a position adopted by a mi-
nority of jurisdictions such as Texas,4 7 which have incorporated
145 See id. § 222(1), (2).
16 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 222(2) cmt. b; see also id. § 222(2) cmt. c.
Comment c to section 222(2) of the Restatement provides, in pertinent part:
c. Distinction between exculpatory provisions and those limiting trustee's
duties. If by the terms of the trust it is provided that the trustee shall not
be under any duty to do or to refrain from doing an act which but for such
provision it would be the duty of the trustee to do or refrain from doing,
the trustee does not commit a breach of trust in doing or failing to do the
act, unless such provision is ineffective as contrary to public policy. If,
however, the trustee is not relieved of such a duty either because there is
no provision to that effect in the terms of the trust or because such provi-
sion is ineffective as against public policy, a provision in the terms of the
trust that the trustee shall not be liable for breach of trust is against public
policy to the extent stated in Comment b.
As to the effect of the terms of the trust upon the standard of care and skill
required of a trustee, see § 174, Comment d.
As to the effect of the terms of the trust upon the extent of discretion given
to trustees in the exercise of powers conferred upon them, see § 187.
Id. (emphasis omitted).147 See TEY. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.059 (West 1995) (prohibiting a trustor from
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section 17 of the Uniform Trusts Act." Despite the rationale
posited for the rules contained in section 222, the two contradic-
tory provisions of sections 170 and 222 still exist side by side.
The contradiction was not addressed in Scott on Trusts (which
itself contains the contradiction), Bogert on Trusts and Trus-
tees, 49 or O'Hayer.
IV. RESOLVING THE CONTRADICTION: HEYMAN, TRIGGS, AND
SELF-DEALING IN GOOD FAITH
Notwithstanding the Restatement's apparent internal con-
tradiction regarding the propriety of exoneration clauses
authorizing a trustee's self-dealing, courts may have resolved
this contradiction by requiring trustees authorized to self-deal to
do so in good faith. In the case of Heyman v. Heyman,'50 a hus-
band and wife established a trust for the benefit of their infant
son. 5' A trust provision permitted the purchase or sale of secu-
rities by or for the trust through the trustee Heyman, or any
corporation controlled by him.152 This provision authorized the
trustee to deal with his own firm and make a profit.' The court
held that an exoneration clause authorizing a trustee to self-deal
and thereby earn a "normal profit" does not necessarily contra-
dict the existence of a trust relationship.' However, a trustee's
exercise of such power to self-deal would be subject to the prin-
ciples of equity.55 A "normal profit," according to the court,
would constitute "such reasonable profit or commission as any
relieving a trustee from liability for self-dealing transactions); see also Corpus
Christi Nat'l Bank v. Gerdes, 551 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977, writ refd
n.r.e.) (holding that public policy prohibited only exculpatory clauses that author-
ized self-dealing; a trustee may otherwise be relieved of "duties, restrictions, and
liabilities imposed by law").
148 See J.D. Perovich, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Trust Provision
Authorizing Trustee to Purchase Trust Property, 39 A.L.R.3d 836, 839 n.11 (1971);
see also UNIF. TRUSTS ACT § 17, 7B U.L.A. 788 (1985). Section 17 provides, in perti-
nent part: "no act of the settlor shall relieve a trustee from the duties, restrictions,
and liabilities imposed upon him by Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this Act." Id. Sections 3
and 4 of the Uniform Trusts Act prohibit loans made by a trustee to himself, with
certain exceptions, whereas section 5 prohibits a trustee from selling trust property
to himself. See id. at §§ 3-5.149 BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 58.
1"0 33 N.Y.S.2d 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942).
... See id. at 237.
152 See id. at 240-41.
1 See id. at 240.
1 See id. at 241.
165 See id.
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banking or brokerage firm might make in dealing with a prudent
trustee in the normal course of business."56
Accordingly, the court held that when a trust instrument, by
its terms, relaxes the absolute rule proscribing self-dealing by a
trustee and grants to the trustee power to deal with himself, in
his individual capacity, this power must be exercised "in the best
of faith and to evince the highest degree of disinterestedness,
loyalty and honor." 7 A court of equity will not give effect to ex-
culpatory provisions permitting self-dealing so that a trustee
could loot the corpus and revest it in himself.158 The court rea-
soned that a trustee's profiting to the extent of the entire trust
corpus would transcend the justification of good faith, holding
that "public policy ... will not permit gross negligence or bad
faith in the administration of a trust."1 9
Although the court held that the trustee may earn reason-
able profits in dealing with the trust securities, the trustee
could not purchase assets from the trust at below market
value."6 Similarly, the trustee was prohibited from selling his
own property to the trust at above its market value.'6'
The Heyman court thus "resolved" the contradiction between
sections 170 and 222 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts in a
very simple manner. The provisions of section 222(2) were vir-
tually grafted onto the provisions of section 170(1), so that excul-
patory clauses for self-dealing transactions would be permitted,
provided the self-dealing trustee did not exceed the boundaries of
good faith. Essentially, the "no further inquiry" standard of un-
divided loyalty would, in the case of an exoneration clause spe-
cifically authorizing self-dealing, be replaced by a good faith
standard as applied to each individual transaction.
62
157 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, §170(1) cmt. s (forbidding a trustee
from disclosing privileged information to third parties).
i See Heyman, 33 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
159 Id. at 243; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 222(2) (making ineffective
any provision relieving liability for breaches of trust "committed in bad faith, inten-
tionally, or with reckless indifference to the interest of the beneficiary").
'go See Heynan, 33 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
161 See id.
162 See Renz v. Beeman, 589 F.2d 735, 744 (2d Cir. 1978) (recognizing that an
exculpatory clause reduces a trustee's duty from utmost loyalty to one of good faith);
see also Morris v. The Broadview, Inc., 65 N.E.2d 605, 609-10 (MI. App. Ct. 1946)
(upholding a trust provision granting a corporation's trustee the right to participate
in ownership, so long as such participation did not amount to an abuse of power).
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A Massachusetts case, New England Trust Co. v. Triggs,"
similarly intertwined sections 170 and 222 of the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts. In Triggs, a trust company sold securities
which comprised the corpus of a testamentary trust and depos-
ited the proceeds of such sale into its own commercial depart-
ment, pursuant to a statute which authorized such deposits."
The bank allowed the sale proceeds to remain uninvested pend-
ing distribution of such proceeds to the beneficiaries of the
trust." In addition, an exculpatory clause in the will provided
that "[elach of my trustees ... shall be liable for his own receipts,
payments and wilful defaults and for nothing else .... ""
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the
decree of the probate court and surcharged the trustees for the
profits realized through the lending of the uninvested trust
funds. 67 In reaching its decision, the court first noted that the
Massachusetts statute specifically permitted a trust company to
deposit trust funds into its own commercial department, pro-
vided appropriate security was deposited.1 68  Notwithstanding
this statutory authorization for a trustee-bank to self-deal, how-
ever, the court reasoned that the mere fact that a statute permit-
ted a trustee-bank to deposit undistributed funds into its com-
mercial department did not nullify the policy arguments
supporting the contrary rule (prohibiting self-dealing by a trus-
tee-bank). 69 A trustee-bank holding the uninvested funds in its
commercial department might be "tempt[ed] to leave the money
on deposit for an' unnecessarily long time, since the bank is
making a profit by lending the money at a greater rate of inter-
' 135 N.E.2d 541 (Mass. 1956).
14 See id. at 547. The Massachusetts statute provided, in pertinent part:
[FMunds held in the trust department of any trust company, whether or not
incorporated as such, awaiting investment or distribution may be deposited
in its commercial department if such corporation shall first transfer to its
trust department to be held as security therefor bonds, notes, bills and
certificates of indebtedness of the United States or of this commonwealth,
or any of them, of an aggregate value of not less in amount than funds so
deposited, and shall at all times maintain the value of such security at
such amount.
Id. at 547 n.1 (quoting MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 172, § 54A (West 1958) (current
version at ch. 167G, § 8 (1994))).
16 See Triggs, 135 N.E.2d at 544.
1'6 Id at 545.
1'7 See id. at 551-52.
'6 See id at 547.
169 See id. at 548.
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est than it pays on the account, if indeed any interest at all is
paid on such accounts."
1 70
However, by surcharging the trustee-bank for the interest
earned on the uninvested funds, the court did not ignore the
provisions of the exoneration clause in determining the extent of
the surcharge. 1  While the court was not prepared, in the ab-
sence of express and clear exculpatory language, to allow the
trustee-bank to retain the actual profits realized from its use of
the trust funds, it declined to extend the surcharge to the princi-
pal and legal rate of interest in the event the trust sustained a
loss.' The court reasoned that the exoneration clause precluded
the imposition of such liability upon the trustee-bank.73
In the wake of Triggs several questions remain as to the
scope of the rule against self-dealing transactions and the exon-
eration clauses which authorize such transactions. First, the
court surcharged profits realized from an unreasonably long
withholding from investment. While this "unreasonable with-
holding" standard might reconcile sections 170 and 222, the
court failed to rule that unreasonable withholding could consti-
tute "bad faith" for the purposes of section 222.'74 Furthermore,
the court held that the language of the exculpatory clause did not
"excuse the trustee from accounting for profits which accrue to it
... in the absence of express and clear language which would in
effect make the trustee ... a beneficiary of the trust."75 This
holding implicitly contradicts section 222(2) of the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts, which prohibits a self-dealing trustee from
profiting from a breach of trust, even if an exoneration clause
authorized such "breach of trust."76 Conversely, this portion of
the Triggs holding would be in implicit accord with section
170 Id (quoting ScoTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 78, § 170.18).
171 See id. at 551.
"7 See id.
173 See id.
174 Id. at 548. The court concluded that:
there was not at any time conscious intent to have the bank profit through
overlong withholding of cash from investment ... therefore, ... there was
not either the bad faith or intentional and reckless indifference to the
rights of beneficiaries which would be the basis for sustaining in the main,
the surcharges imposed below.
Id.
"7 Id. at 551.
176 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 222(2).
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170(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts.'77 As such, Triggs
arguably lies between the positions of Section 170(1) and 222(2)
of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts. Unlike Heyman, section
222's good faith requirement was not simply grafted onto the
permissive provisions of Restatement (Second) of Trusts section
170(1). Instead, the court's holding seems to borrow individual
elements of sections 170(1) and 222(2).
A. Status of the Exoneration Clause Where a Statute Prohibits
Self-Dealing Though Not Explicitly Invalidating Exoneration
Clauses
What would be the effect of an exoneration clause in a trust
instrument which specifically authorizes self-dealing if the gov-
erning statute itself prohibits self-dealing? In In re Krause's Es-
tate, 1 78 a charitable trust instrument authorized the trustees to
purchase at book value "all or any" of the capital stock of the
Wolverine Tanning Corporation, a trust asset. 79  The probate
court approved the subsequent purchase of over 47,000 shares by
the trustees, and the circuit court dismissed the Attorney Gen-
eral's challenge to the transaction."s The Michigan Court of Ap-
peals, in affirming the dismissal, held that a statutory prohibi-
tion against self-dealing 8' is superseded by an exoneration
clause authorizing such self-dealing because the statutory pro-
hibition was merely a restatement of the common law rule
against self-dealing."" Accordingly, the trustees were permitted
to purchase the shares at a profit."
On the other hand, the Ohio Court of Appeals adopted a dif-
177 See id § 170(1).
1'78 172 N.W.2d 468 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969).
178 Id. at 469.
'8' See id. at 470.
181 The applicable statute provided that:
Except with the written approval of the probate court, a fiduciary in his
personal capacity shall not engage in any transaction whatsoever with the
estate which he represents, nor shall he invest estate funds in any com-
pany, corporation or association with which he is affiliated, other than as a
bondholder or minority stockholder. A fiduciary in his personal capacity
shall not personally derive any profit from the purchase, sale or transfer of
any property of said estate.
Id at 471 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 704.37 (1948) (current version at §
700.561 (West 1995))).
2 See Krause, 172 N.W.2d at 471-72.
3 See id. at 473.
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ferent position with regard to the interaction between the statu-
tory proscription of self-dealing and trust provisions authorizing
such self-dealing. In Walters v. Wannemacher,'" the testator
provided in his will that the nominated executor, testator's ten-
ant and personal friend, would be granted a right to purchase, in
his individual capacity, a certain tract of land from the estate."
The governing Ohio statute which regulated fiduciary self-
dealing provided that:
[fliduciaries shall not buy from or sell to themselves nor shall
they in their individual capacities have any dealings with the
estate, except as expressly authorized by the instrument creat-
ing the trust and then only to the extent expressly permitted ...
by [statute] or with the approval of the probate court in each in-
stance.
186
The Ohio Court of Appeals held that statutory prohibition of self-
dealing is expressive of the common law, and any self-dealing
made contrary to the statutory exception is at least voidable.'8 7
Accordingly, the court held that as long as the beneficiary of a
right to purchase estate property is an executor, regardless of
the will's provision regarding price or the formula to determine
such a price, self-dealing purchases by executors will require
court approval.1"
B. The Status of an Exoneration Clause Where the Statute
Prohibits Both Self-Dealing and Exoneration Clauses Permitting
Self-Dealing
If a statute established both a prohibition against self-
dealing and a prohibition against exoneration clauses authoriz-
ing self-dealing, then exoneration clauses authorizing such self-
dealing would be held ineffective as against public policy. This is
184 217 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964).
18 See id. at 696.
18 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2109.44 (Anderson 1994).
87 See Walters, 217 N.E.2d at 698-99 (citing Magee v. Troutwine, 143 N.E.2d
581 (Ohio 1957)).
8 See id. at 698. But see Huntington Natl Bank v. Wolfe, 651 N.E.2d 458 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1994), wherein the court noted that "R.C. 2109.44, which prohibits self-
dealing, makes an exception with respect to an individual fiduciary acting in his in-
dividual capacity if expressly authorized by the instrument creating the trust." Id.
at 466-67. The court's dictum, which purportedly interpreted R.S. 2109.44, ignored
the requirement of probate court approval. See id. Hence, the case arguably should
not constitute authority for the ostensible proposition that Ohio relaxed its rule re-
garding the propriety of exoneration clauses permitting fiduciary self-dealing.
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the rule in jurisdictions such as Texas"5 9 and Oklahoma, 90 which
have adopted the provisions of section 17 of the Uniform Trusts
Act: "[n]o act of the settlor shall relieve a trustee from the duties,
restrictions, and liabilities imposed upon him by Sections 3, 4
and 5 of this Act."' 9'
The case of Interfirst Bank Dallas, N.A. v. Risser'92 demon-
strates how a Texas court, even in the face of a statute proscrib-
ing self-dealing, fused the concepts of self-dealing and good faith
while analyzing a given transaction. In Interfirst Bank, a testa-
tor set up two testamentary trusts wherein the nominated trus-
tees were the testator's brother and Interfirst Bank.9 ' Pursuant
to the provisions of the will, 968.5 shares of Southwest Pump
Company stock were to be split between the two trusts.'9 Fol-
lowing the death of the testator's brother, Interfirst Bank be-
came the sole trustee. 95
Interfirst Bank in its capacity as trustee sold the 968.5
shares back to Southwest Pump Company for $500,000,98 which
the jury found to be equal to one-third of the fair market value.'97
Without notifying the trust beneficiaries, Interfirst Bank sold
the shares without making an attempt to solicit higher offers for
the purchase of the shares or to arrange for competitive bid-
ding.' "98 In addition, Interfirst Bank had a long-standing banking
"' See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.059(b) (West 1995) (providing that "[a] set-
tlor may not relieve a corporate trustee from the duties, restrictions, or liabilities of
Section 113.052 [prohibiting trustee from loaning trust funds to himself] or [Section]
113.053 [prohibiting the purchase or sale of trust property by trustee to himself] of
this Act."). The prohibition on the use of exoneration clauses extends to all trustees.
See id.; see also Langford v. Shamburger, 417 S.W.2d 438, 444 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
(holding that it would be contrary to public policy to permit the language of a trust
instrument to authorize self-dealing by a trustee).
1 0 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.21 (West 1994), which provides that "no
act of the trustor shall relieve a corporate trustee from the duties, restrictions, and
liabilities imposed upon it by Sections 9 [prohibiting a trustee from lending trust
funds to itself], 10, and 11 [prohibiting a trustee from buying or selling trust prop-
erty to himself] of this act."
"' UNIF. TRUSTS ACT § 17, 7B U.L.A. 787, 788 (1985). Section 3 of the Act pro-
hibits a trustee from lending trust funds to itself. Id. § 3, at 771. Section 5 prohibits
a trustee from buying or selling trust property from or to itself. Id. § 5, at 774.
19 739 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. App. 1987).
193 See id. at 886.
19 See id.
'g See id. at 886-87.
'9 See id. at 887.
"9 See id.
"99 See id. at 891.
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relationship with Southwest which, at the time, included out-
standing loans.' Interfirst Bank had also served as trustee for
the company's deferred compensation plan.200 Furthermore, a
loan officer of Interfirst Bank testified that the bank was inter-
ested in maintaining the then-existing management structure of
Southwest as well as ensuring that its loans would be repaid 0'
The sale of the stock to Southwest allowed the company to resell
it to its controlling shareholder,0 2 a transaction which in fact se-
cured the continued existence of the current management.2 3 Fi-
nally, incorporated within the trust instrument was a section
providing that "[tihe Trustee shall never be liable for any action
or any failure to act hereunder in the absence of proof of bad
faith."2
4
The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court decision
and held that Interfirst Bank had breached its fiduciary duty to
the beneficiaries through self-dealing in the sale of the stock to
Southwest Pump Company.25 The court noted that in Texas, a
trust instrument may, in fact, relieve a trustee of certain duties
and obligations.26 However, the language of such a trust agree-
ment may not authorize self-dealing, as it is violative of Texas
public policy.27 Likewise, the court observed that an exculpatory
provision cannot "relieve the trustee of liability for action taken
in bad faith or for acting intentionally adverse or with reckless
indifference to the interests of the beneficiary."
208
The trustee's duty of loyalty requires that it seek the best
price for the trust property and secure competitive bidding to sell
such property at the greatest advantage to the trust.2 9 The court
noted that a trustee's sale of trust property for a price slightly
199 See id. at 904.
200 See id. at 896.
201 See id.
22 See id. at 887.
2'3 See id. at 896.
20 Id. at 888 (quoting the trust instrument).
20 See id. at 905 (explaining that the lack of effort to obtain the best price for
the stock, the failure to notify the beneficiaries of the sale and to get an outside ap-
praisal, combined with Interfirst's own interest as a lender to Southwest, estab-
lished ample evidence of self-dealing).
2 See id. at 888; see also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-22 (repealed
1984), TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.059 (West 1995).
207 See Interfirst Bank, 739 S.W.2d at 888 (citing Langford v. Shamburger, 417
S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App 1967)).
20 Id (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 222(2)).
209 See id. at 891 (citing BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 58, §749).
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less than the fair market value would not, in and of itself, consti-
tute self-dealing.210 However, the court reasoned that an exces-
sive variation between market value and sales price is some evi-
dence of bad faith. 11 The Interfirst jury found that the sale was
made at one-third the fair market value and done without pub-
licizing the sale, soliciting offers, or obtaining an appraisal.
212
The court held that these three factors, when considered in the
aggregate, constituted evidence of bad faith and self-dealing.
2 13
Furthermore, the court noted that the sale of stock to the Com-
pany was done to enable it to repay its loans to Interfirst Bank
and ensure that the corporate management structure remained
intact.2 4 Therefore, the court found that trustee-bank's reason
for the sale constituted a self-serving motive, and held that the
sale was a self-dealing transaction. 5 As a result, the court re-
moved Interfirst Bank as trustee, ordered it to account for the
difference between the sale price and the fair market value of the
stock at the time of the sale, and ordered it to pay other exem-
plary damages.1 6
In Interfirst Bank, the Texas Court of Appeals admittedly
expanded the definition of "self-dealing" beyond that provided for
in the Texas Property Code.1 7 Whereas the Code prohibited a
transaction by a trustee to itself or to a corporate entity con-
trolled by such trustee,1 8 the Interfirst Bank court set forth its
210 See id. at 895.
211 See id. at 905. "The price of one-third of the market value is a fact from
which inferences of bad faith and self-dealing can be drawn." Id.
212 See id.
211 See id.
214 See id.
215 See id. "[Tihe jury had a basis from which to conclude that the trustee ac-
quired a gain by reason of its trusteeship. Under these circumstances, we find suffi-
dent evidence ... to uphold the jury's finding on both bad faith and self-dealing." Id.
216 See id. at 909.
217 Id. at 899
218 See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.053 (West 1995). Section 113.053 provides,
in pertinent part:
§ 113.053. Purchase or Sale of Trust Property by Trustee (a) Except as
provided ... a trustee shall not directly or indirectly buy or sell trust prop-
erty from or to:
(1) the trustee or an affiliate;
(2) a director, officer, or employee of the trustee or an affiliate;
(3) a relative of the trustee; or
(4) the trustee's employer, partner, or other business associate.
k&; see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.052 (West 1995) (providing that a trustee
may not lend trust funds to a trustee or an affiliate).
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own definition that "any conduct by the trustee which violates
fiduciary duty by taking advantage of the trustee's position as
trustee to benefit the trustee or some third person which the
trustee desires to be benefited, can constitute self-dealing."19
The transaction made by the trustee-bank in Interfirst Bank
was admittedly not to itself or to a corporation controlled by it. o
The court refused to categorize the transaction between Inter-
first Bank and Southwest Pump as one between "business asso-
ciates," which categorization would have triggered the self-
dealing statute.2' The court pointed out that if Interfirst Bank
was not in a position to gain an advantage for itself as a lender
an improper motive could not be inferred. But because it was in
such position, and it did not make a diligent effort to obtain the
best price possible for the shares, these factors supported a
finding of bad faith and self-dealing.2 Arguably, the transac-
tions between Interfirst Bank and Southwest did have an im-
proper motive, which the court noted as an essential element of
bad faith. However, the court need not have engaged in an ex-
pansive definition of self-dealing as it could have held that the
Interfirst transaction would be set aside because of bad faith
alone, since self-dealing strictu sensu was admittedly not estab-
lished.2
CONCLUSION
The rule prohibiting self-dealing by a fiduciary has been in-
voked to avoid a myriad of transactions made between trusts and
trustees as individuals or corporate entities over which trustees
enjoy substantial influence. The purpose of the self-dealing rule
is to ensure compliance with a trustee's "punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive."' As one English court pointedly observed,
219 Interfirst Bank, 739 S.W.2d at 899.
2'0 See id. at 900.
221 See id. at 896. The court interpreted the term business associate as including
"a relationship which is generally confidential in nature, ... it should be more than
just a party with whom a contract is made and more than just a relationship of a
business to a customer. An example of a business associate includable under the act
is a joint venturer." Id
22 See id. at 905.
22 See id. at 899 (concluding that "there was no statutory self-dealing"); cf. In re
Estate of Rothko, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 940 (Sur. Ct. 1975) (using a more expansive
definition of self-dealing), modified on other grounds, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870 (App. Div.),
affd, 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977).
4 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 546 (N.Y. 1928).
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"the shepherd must not become a wolf."'
In most non-Uniform Trust Act jurisdictions, exoneration
clauses have been employed to circumvent the harshness of the
"no further inquiry" rule's a priori avoidance of the self-dealing
transaction. These clauses, however, must be sufficiently ex-
plicit to enable a court to elicit the settlor's clear intent to excul-
pate a self-dealing trustee; a mere grant of wide managerial
authority in the trust instrument will not suffice.
In its zeal to prevent a self-dealing trustee from becoming a
virtual self-aggrandizing wolf by the exploitation of generous ex-
oneration clauses, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts sets forth
standards according to which a trustee could never profit from a
self-dealing transaction. Unfortunately, the standards dealing
with exoneration clauses contradict those which expressly sanc-
tion trust provisions allowing self-dealing transactions and the
concomitant profit inuring to the trustee. As this Article has
discussed, both the Heyman and Triggs decisions provide possi-
ble solutions to the contradiction.
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts should squarely address
the contradiction between sections 170 and 222 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts, either by adopting the majority ap-
proach of section 170(1) or by incorporating the Texas-UTA ap-
proach embodied in section 222(2). If the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts fails to adopt a clear position regarding the contradiction,
the Heyman court's "self-dealing in good faith" approach should
be adopted, as that solution is arguably closest to effectively re-
solving the problem.
Additionally, should an attorney-draftsman of a trust be
both counsel for the settlor and a director of the corporate trus-
tee, and should the corporate trustee request the attorney to in-
sert into the trust an exoneration clause permitting self-dealing,
a written disclosure form should be executed by the attorney and
the settlor which would set forth the various roles the attorney
would be fulfilling, the conflicts inherent in the simultaneous
"wearing of many hats," and the plain meaning of the exonera-
tion clause at issue.
Exoneration clauses have at times conflicted with express
statutory prohibitions of self-dealing. Most jurisdictions allow
probate courts to give advance authorization to otherwise pro-
Tito v. Waddell (No 2), [1977] Ch. 106, 241 (Eng.).
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scribed self-dealing transactions. 6 Nevertheless, the courts are
divided as to whether or not the statutes prohibiting self-dealing
are merely declarative of the common law so as to permit exon-
eration clauses authorizing self-dealing transactions.
The Texas-UTA approach to the self-dealing transaction and
exoneration clauses is seemingly clear-cut. The Texas-UTA ap-
proach, echoing Restatement (Second) of Trusts section 222(2),
defines the self-dealing transaction in a statute which proscribes
self-dealing in any form. Accordingly, any exoneration clause
which purported to permit such statutory self-dealing transac-
tions would be struck down as violative of public policy. The
Texas-UTA approach is concededly the minority approach with
respect to the propriety of exoneration clauses permitting self-
dealing and ostensibly seems to be an express safeguard against
the existence of self-dealing transactions. Yet, the approach's
weakness lies in its very specificity. Whereas those self-dealing
transactions which are specifically set forth in the Texas statute
will be struck down as violative of public policy, other transac-
tions, whose categorization is not as obvious as that of a trustee
selling trust property to himself, will not be struck down as
statutory self-dealing.
The case of Interfirst Bank shows how a court can give an
expansive interpretation to the term self-dealing and by so do-
ing, render the term superfluous and meaningless. Interfirst in-
volved a stock transaction which did not constitute "statutory"
self-dealing; as such, the court could not have invalidated the
transaction and the exoneration clause permitting such a trans-
action as violative of the express statutory proscription against
exoneration clauses permitting self-dealing. Instead, the court
examined whether the transaction itself was undertaken in good
faith, concluded that (non-statutory) self-dealing was bad faith
as a matter of law, and invalidated the transaction as one under-
taken in bad faith. Thus, the court transcended the draconian
Texas-UTA prohibition of statutory self-dealing and transformed
the analysis of non-statutory self-dealing into a befuddled good-
faith analysis as opposed to a self-dealing analysis.
From a policy standpoint, the question is whether upholding
the express terms of a trust and the concomitant wishes of the
settlor/testator is preferable and "more efficient" in terms of ju-
26 See In re Estate of Rothko, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
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dicial resources than upholding and enforcing a statute prohibit-
ing self-dealing. While a superficial examination might lead the
unsuspecting jurist to prefer a blanket prohibition against both
self-dealing and exoneration clauses permitting such transac-
tions, a more thorough examination of the Heyman and Triggs
cases, on the one hand, and the Interfirst Bank case, on the other
hand, conclusively demonstrates that the upholding of the ex-
press terms of the trust, tempered by the superimposed general
principles of equity applicable to all fiduciaries, more effectively
conserves judicial resources and is thus the more "efficient" ap-
proach. Conversely, it is the Interfirst Bank case and its
"statutory" approach which wastes judicial resources by forcing
courts to address the fairness of "non-statutory" self-dealing
transactions.
It is submitted that the Heyman-Restatement section 170
approach of grafting a good faith requirement onto the exonera-
tion clause permitting a trustee to personally profit from self-
dealing, is preferable to the statutory self-dealing position es-
poused by Texas and the UTA. The Heyman approach would
thus uphold the settlor's intent set forth in the terms of the
trust, while subjecting the trust provisions to the superimposed
equitable principles of good faith and fiduciary integrity, so as
not to allow the trustee-shepherd to degenerate into a self-
aggrandizing wolf.
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